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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Aracelis N. Ayala was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a 
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and first 
degree robbery.  She appeals her judgment of conviction on 
several theories, including that the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands lacks jurisdiction to hear cases to which the United 
States is a party, and that judges of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands are prohibited from serving beyond their ten-
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year statutory terms.  She also raises various issues related to 
her criminal trial and sentencing.  For the following reasons, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
On August 19, 2015, a jewelry store on St. Thomas, 
U.S.V.I. was robbed at gunpoint by Turrell Thomas and 
Jakeem Emmanuel.  The store owner and her son were forced 
to lie face down, their hands and mouths duct taped, while 
Thomas and Emmanuel stole about one million dollars’ worth 
of jewelry.  Raheem Miller waited outside in a car and listened 
for police on a scanner to ensure that the robbery would not be 
interrupted.  After Thomas and Emmanuel exited the jewelry 
store with the stolen items, they got in the car, and Miller drove 
away.  Ayala sat in the front passenger seat.   
 
Thomas, Emmanuel, and Miller testified about Ayala’s 
role in the robbery.  Ayala paid for their plane tickets from St. 
Croix to St. Thomas; she reserved and paid for their hotel 
rooms; and, on the morning of the robbery, she picked up and 
paid for the rental car.  After the robbery, she paid Thomas and 
Emmanuel for their work.   
 
 Based on accomplice liability, Ayala was indicted by a 
grand jury on five counts:  Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count One); conspiracy to commit Hobbs 
Act robbery (Count Two); brandishing a firearm during a 
federal crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three); first degree robbery in violation 
of V.I. Code tit. 14, §§ 1861, 1862(2), and 11 (Count Four); 
and using an unlicensed firearm during the commission of a 
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robbery in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 2253(a) (Count 
Five).  The Government later dropped Count Five.   
 
At trial, Ayala raised the affirmative defense of duress.  
She claimed that two men, Bogus a/k/a Bogie (“B”) and Waza 
a/k/a Muwaza (“W”), told her to participate in the robbery, and 
that she only agreed because she feared for her life.  
Additionally, she feared for her brother, who was W’s 
cellmate.  After a three-day trial, the jury found her guilty on 
all four counts.  The District Court sentenced her to 48 months 
of imprisonment on Counts One, Two, and Four to run 
concurrently, and 84 months of imprisonment on Count Three 
to run consecutively.  Ayala timely appealed.  
 
II. 
 
While Ayala argues the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction, as we discuss below, the District Court properly 
exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3241.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
III. 
 
Ayala appeals her convictions and sentence on five 
grounds:  (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction because a 
court created under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution may not 
hear a case to which the United States is a party; (2) the 
presiding judge’s service after his ten-year term violates the 
Appointments Clause and Article III of the U.S. Constitution; 
(3) her convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Virgin Islands’ analogous statutory 
right, V.I. Code tit. 14, § 104; (4) the District Court erred in 
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limiting her cross-examination; and (5) the District Court erred 
in permitting her to be shackled at sentencing.   
 
A. 
 
Ayala argues that the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands lacked jurisdiction to convict her because, as a non-
Article III court, it cannot hear cases to which the United States 
is a party.  We exercise plenary review of legal questions.  
United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 401 (3d Cir. 
2002).  
 
“The District Court of the Virgin Islands derives its 
jurisdiction from Article IV, § 3 of the United States 
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate the 
territories of the United States.”  United States v. Gillette, 738 
F.3d 63, 70 (3d Cir. 2013).  Pursuant to Article IV, “Congress 
establishes the scope of the Virgin Islands District Court’s 
jurisdiction by statute.”  Id.  Congress has provided for such 
jurisdiction in two ways.  First, 
 
The District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have the jurisdiction 
of a District Court of the United 
States, including, but not limited 
to, the diversity jurisdiction 
provided for in section 1332 of 
Title 28 and that of a bankruptcy 
court of the United States.  
 
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  And second,   
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The District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have jurisdiction of 
offenses under the laws of the 
United States, not locally 
inapplicable, committed within the 
territorial jurisdiction of such 
courts, and jurisdiction, 
concurrently with the district 
courts of the United States, of 
offenses against the laws of the 
United States committed upon the 
high seas. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3241.   
 
Pursuant to these congressional grants of jurisdiction, 
we have held that the District Court of the Virgin Islands can 
adjudicate federal criminal offenses.  United States v. Canel, 
708 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983).  Indeed, “[w]ere we to hold 
that Title 18 could not be enforced in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, the entire title would be for all intents and 
purposes a dead letter in the territory.”  Id.  This conclusion 
follows from the Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828).  There, the 
Supreme Court observed that territorial courts are “legislative 
Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty 
which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause 
which enables Congress to make all needful rules and 
regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United 
States.”  Id. at 546.  Similarly, we have noted that “Congress 
assumed that it had the plenary sovereignty recognized in 
[Canter]” to pass legislation that creates courts for the 
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territories, and to define the jurisdiction of those territorial 
courts.  Canel, 708 F.2d at 896. 
 
Ayala’s contention — that territorial courts cannot hear 
cases in which the United States is a party — is a mere re-
wording of the argument we rejected in Canel.  The District 
Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction to hear federal 
criminal cases, and the United States is a party to every federal 
criminal case.  Our holding in Canel would be meaningless if 
territorial courts lacked jurisdiction in cases to which the 
United States is a party.  Indeed, territorial courts have long 
heard such cases.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 154 (1878) (affirming a conviction entered by the 
territorial court of Utah for the federal crime of bigamy). 
 
Ayala argues that Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 
(1962), casts doubt on the continued vitality of Canter.  She 
contends that Justice Harlan’s plurality opinion stands for the 
proposition that Canter is no longer good law because it was 
premised on practical concerns of governing territories “in a 
day of poor roads and slow mails.”  Id. at 546.  But her attempt 
to cast doubt on Canter is unavailing, as the quote about 
practical concerns ignores what the Supreme Court recognized 
two paragraphs prior:  
 
All the Chief Justice meant [in 
Canter], and what the case has ever 
after been taken to establish, is that 
in the territories cases and 
controversies falling within the 
enumeration of Article III may be 
heard and decided in courts 
constituted without regard to the 
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limitations of that article; courts, 
that is, having judges of limited 
tenure and entertaining business 
beyond the range of conventional 
cases and controversies. 
 
Id. at 544-45 (footnote omitted).  Since at least 1828, it has 
been the law that Congress may create territorial courts that 
have jurisdiction to hear cases that Article III courts have 
jurisdiction to hear.  The Supreme Court’s teaching in Canter 
is not limited because the Virgin Islands are now equipped with 
paved roads, planes, and the Internet.  The law remains the 
same.  Article IV, § 3 grants Congress the power to do what it 
believes proper to regulate the territories, whether that is 
creating courts with the same jurisdiction as United States 
District Courts, or not creating courts at all.   
 
 We hold that the District Court of the Virgin Islands in 
this case properly exercised the jurisdiction granted to it by 
Congress under Article IV of the Constitution. 
 
B. 
 
Ayala argues that her convictions are invalid because 
the ten-year statutory term of the judge presiding over her trial 
had expired.  The issue therefore is whether a judge serving on 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, may continue to serve 
even though the judge’s ten-year statutory term has expired.  
We exercise plenary review of legal questions.  Perez-Oviedo, 
281 F.3d at 401.  
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1. 
 
Acting pursuant to its Article IV authority, Congress has 
provided that: 
 
The President shall, by and with 
the advice and consent of the 
Senate, appoint two judges for the 
District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, who shall hold office for 
terms of ten years and until their 
successors are chosen and 
qualified, unless sooner removed 
by the President for cause. 
 
48 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (emphasis added).  To interpret the 
meaning of a statute, we begin with the language itself.  See 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989).  The language of the statute is plain:  a judge may serve 
for ten years and be replaced at the end of the term; a judge 
may serve for less than ten years if he is removed for cause; or 
a judge may serve for more than ten years, until a successor is 
chosen and qualified.   
 
If Congress wanted the ten-year term to expire after ten 
years regardless of whether a successor had been appointed and 
qualified, it would have said so.  Congress has done so before.  
For example, Congress passed a statute providing that “District 
attorneys shall be appointed for a term of four years and their 
commissions shall cease and expire at the expiration of four 
years from their respective dates.”  Parsons v. United States, 
167 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1897) (quoting Rev. Stat. § 769).  In 
reviewing an analogous statute, the Supreme Court observed 
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that “[t]he law intended no more than that these officers should 
certainly, at the end of that term, be either out of office, or 
subjected again to the scrutiny of the Senate upon a 
renomination.”  Id. at 333 (quoting 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 288, 291 
(1851)).  A more recent example illustrates the same principle.  
Congress passed a statute authorizing the appointment of 
judges to the Tax Courts, provided that the “term of office of 
any judge of the Tax Court shall expire 15 years after he takes 
office.”  26 U.S.C. § 7443(e).   
 
Here, in contrast, Congress did not explicitly provide 
that the term will cease and expire after ten years.  Congress 
explicitly provided for the opposite by including the phrase 
“and until their successors are chosen and qualified.”  48 
U.S.C. § 1614(a).  The clear language of the statute necessitates 
the conclusion that a judge of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands may serve past the expiration of the term, until the 
President nominates and the Senate confirms a successor. 
 
2. 
 
There is also no constitutional problem with a judge of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands serving beyond ten 
years.  Ayala raises two potential constitutional concerns with 
the statute:  the Appointments Clause and Article III. 
 
The Appointments Clause provides: 
 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are 
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not herein otherwise provided for, 
and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by 
Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments. 
 
U.S. Const., art II, § 2, cl. 2.  “The Constitution, for purposes 
of appointment . . . divides all its officers into two classes.”  
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1878).  The two 
classes are principal officers and inferior officers.  “Principal 
officers are selected by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  Inferior officers Congress may allow to 
be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of 
departments, or by the Judiciary.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 132 (1976) (per curiam).  While the “line between” the two 
classes is often “far from clear,” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 671 (1988), it is clear here.  Judges of the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands must be confirmed by the Senate, 48 
U.S.C. § 1614(a); therefore, their status as principal officers is 
unquestionable.  Accordingly, judges of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands must be nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.  Their appointment is valid beyond 
the ten-year term because the President and the Senate 
explicitly nominated and confirmed them “for terms of ten 
years and until their successors are chosen and qualified.”  48 
U.S.C. § 1614(a).  The Virgin Islands statute does not run afoul 
of the Appointments Clause. 
 
Ayala also contends that allowing a judge of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands to serve past the expiration of the 
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term effectively robes the judge with “de facto life tenure” in 
violation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.  Ayala Br. 30.  
But her argument ignores the fact that a successor may be 
chosen and qualified at any time.  A territorial judge is not 
transformed into an Article III judge with life tenure by virtue 
of the fact that he or she may serve beyond the statutory term.   
 
The Supreme Court has long held that while territorial 
courts can exercise the same jurisdiction as District Courts of 
the United States, territorial judges are not robed with the 
privileges of Article III judges.  See Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 
235, 244 (1850) (holding that judges of territorial courts who 
serve a term of four years cannot receive the “constitutional 
tenure of office” of Article III judges).  Indeed, Article III was 
“not violated by a statute prescribing for the office of judge of 
a territorial court a tenure for a fixed term of years, or 
authorizing his suspension . . . and his ultimate displacement 
from office, after suspension, by the appointment of some one 
in his place, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 188 (1891).   
 
In Canel, we held it does not violate due process when 
a judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands presides over 
a criminal trial despite not having life tenure.  Canel, 708 F.2d 
at 897.  While Ayala does not allege a due process violation, 
the underlying logic of Canel stymies her contention.  A judge 
without life tenure may validly preside over federal criminal 
cases because Congress, acting pursuant to its Article IV 
authority, has provided for it.  Judges of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands serving beyond the ten-year term — who 
may be replaced tomorrow, in five years, or in thirty-five years 
— are decidedly not judges with life tenure.  We therefore hold 
that judges of the District Court of the Virgin Islands may 
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continue to serve until a successor is chosen and qualified, and 
such continued service does not violate Article III.  
 
3. 
 
Ayala further argues that the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands must be established as an Article III court with Article 
III judges.  But she misses the distinction between what 
Congress may do under the Constitution, and what it should 
do.  It is clear that Congress is authorized to create territorial 
courts, appoint judges for those courts, and provide or limit the 
jurisdiction of those courts.  Congress may do this, and indeed 
has passed legislation doing just so.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3241; 48 
U.S.C. § 1612(a).  But whether or not Congress should 
establish the District Court of the Virgin Islands as one under 
Article III is not our business.  Any argument that the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands should be established as an Article 
III court must be addressed to Congress, not to us.   
 
C. 
 
 Ayala argues that her convictions for Hobbs Act 
robbery (Count One) and first degree robbery under Virgin 
Islands law (Count Four) are multiplicitous and violate both 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
section 104 of title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code.1  Our 
                                              
1 The Virgin Islands and the United States “are considered one 
sovereignty for the purposes of determining whether an 
individual may be punished under both Virgin Islands and 
United States statutes for a similar offense growing out of the 
same occurrence.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 
399, 406 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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standard of review is plenary over double jeopardy and 
multiplicity rulings.  United States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184, 194 
(3d Cir. 2017).   
 
 Ayala’s Double Jeopardy Clause argument is squarely 
foreclosed by our precedent.  We have held that convictions for 
both Hobbs Act robbery2 and Virgin Islands first degree 
robbery3 do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because 
“each requires proof of an additional element not required by 
the other.”  United States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 
                                              
   
2 A Hobbs Act robbery occurs when one:   
 
in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or 
commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or 
conspires so to do, or commits or 
threatens physical violence to any 
person or property in furtherance 
of a plan or purpose to do anything 
in violation of this section . . . .  
 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
 
3 The Virgin Islands Code defines first degree robbery as:  “A 
person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the 
course of the commission of the crime or immediate flight 
therefrom, he or another perpetrator of the crime . . . (2) 
[d]isplays, uses or threatens the use of a dangerous weapon.”  
V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1862(2). 
 15 
 
2000) (applying test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).  Specifically, the “federal charge 
requires that [the defendant’s] offense ‘affect[ ] commerce’ as 
an element of the crime.  By contrast, the Virgin Islands crime 
of robbery . . . requires, as an element of the crime, proof that 
[the defendant] displayed, used or threatened to use a 
dangerous weapon, and does not implicate [whether it affects 
commerce] as does the federal offense.”  Id. 
 
Second, Ayala contends that section 104 of title 14 of 
the Virgin Islands Code, which “affords greater protections 
than the Double Jeopardy Clause,” Tyson v. People, 59 V.I. 
391, 427 (2013), prohibits multiple punishments under 
different provisions of the Virgin Islands Code for the same 
act.  Because the robbery was one act, she claims, her 
convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and Virgin Islands first 
degree robbery violate section 104.  Section 104 provides: 
 
An act or omission which is made 
punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of this Code 
may be punished under any of such 
provisions, but in no case may it be 
punished under more than one.  An 
acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any one bars a 
prosecution for the same act or 
omission under any other. 
 
V.I. Code tit. 14, § 104.  The plain language of section 104 — 
specifically the prepositional phrase “of this Code” — makes 
clear that it prohibits multiple punishments for one act under 
different provisions of the Virgin Islands Code.  Ayala was not 
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punished for the act of robbery under multiple provisions of the 
Virgin Islands Code.  She was found guilty of violating and 
sentenced under only one, V.I. Code tit. 14, § 1862(2). 
 
Accordingly, we hold her convictions are not 
multiplicitous under section 104, nor do they violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.4 
 
D. 
 
Ayala challenges the District Court’s limitation on her 
ability to cross-examine the Government’s witnesses about B’s 
and W’s reputations for violence.  She contends that this line 
of questioning should have been allowed because it went to the 
heart of her affirmative defense of duress:  that she only 
committed the crime because she believed B and W would hurt 
her or her family if she did not and her fear was objectively 
reasonable.  The District Court excluded this line of 
questioning on cross-examination under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, which provides that “[t]he court may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 
We review a district court’s decision regarding the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  “A district 
court has broad discretion in conducting [a Rule 403] analysis, 
                                              
4 In the alternative, she asks us to certify this question to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  We decline to do so.   
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provided that its reasoning is on the record.”  United States v. 
Welshans, 892 F.3d 566, 575 (3d Cir. 2018); see also United 
States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen 
reviewing a district court’s admission of evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, we do not afford that court the 
deference normally afforded when we review for abuse of 
discretion if the district court failed to engage in on-the-record 
balancing.”).  “If a district court does not conduct this on-the-
record balancing, we either remand the case to the district court 
or, where practical, undertake this balancing ourselves.”  Id. at 
117-18. 
 
The District Court did not state its reasoning for 
excluding the evidence under Rule 403, but here it is practical 
to conduct the balancing ourselves.  On cross-examination, 
Ayala sought to elicit information about B and W from five 
government witnesses:  Detective Sofia Rachid, FBI Agent 
Christopher Forvour, Emmanuel, Thomas, and Miller.  The 
court allowed Ayala to ask if a witness knew B or W, whether 
a witness was afraid of them, and how that fear impacted a 
witness’s decisions.  Miller and Emmanuel both testified on 
cross-examination about their fear of B and W.  While the 
court, citing Rule 403, did not allow Miller to answer what B’s 
reputation for violence was, it did permit the following 
examination: 
 
Q. But you don’t want to say 
Bogie’s name out loud to this jury.  
You referred to him as a guy 
instead? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now why is that?  Why 
wouldn’t you want to say Bogie’s 
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name and tell this jury about 
Bogie?  Why did you try to hide his 
identity? . . .  
A. Out of fear. 
Q. “Out of fear.”  Fear of – what are you fearful 
of? 
A. Of him. 
 
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 204.  Emmanuel testified on cross-
examination that he turned himself in to the police after the 
robbery because he “felt threatened big-time” by B and W.  JA 
305-06.  The court allowed him to testify that B and W are 
“both dangerous dudes” and that he was afraid of their “reach” 
and the violence they could do to his family and him.  JA 307-
10.  Thomas, in contrast to Miller and Emmanuel, testified that 
he was not afraid of B or W.   
 
While we are troubled that the District Court did not 
provide on-the-record balancing for its Rule 403 rulings, we 
are satisfied that it did not abuse its discretion by limiting 
cross-examination.  It is clear from the record that admitting 
evidence about B’s and W’s crimes and reputations would pose 
a danger of confusing the jury.  Ayala’s duress defense did not 
depend on B’s and W’s past crimes or reputations.  B and W 
were not on trial, and exploring through testimony how 
dangerous they were could also have been prejudicial.  
Moreover, the evidence’s probative value was slight to none. 
What Ayala sought to prove — namely, that she faced an 
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; her claimed 
fear was well-grounded; this immediate threat directly caused 
her criminal acts; and she did not recklessly place herself in the 
situation, see Mod. Crim. Jury Instr. 3d Cir. 8.03 (Apr. 2015) 
(providing instructions for duress defense) — had nothing to 
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do with B’s and W’s reputations.  Therefore, the dangers of 
confusing and unfairly prejudicing the jury substantially 
outweighed the reputation testimony’s slight (if any) probative 
value.  The District Court’s narrow limitation on cross-
examination did not hinder Ayala from eliciting the evidence 
that went to her duress defense.  The court allowed the jury to 
hear whether her co-conspirators were afraid of B and W, and 
how that fear impacted their participation in the robbery and 
their actions afterward.  Accordingly, we hold the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting cross-
examination based on Rule 403. 
 
E. 
 
 Ayala contends that the District Court’s decision to 
shackle her during her sentencing was an abuse of discretion.  
We review decisions about shackling for abuse of discretion.  
See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005).   
 
 At her sentencing hearing, Ayala requested her shackles 
be removed.  The District Court denied the request, noting, 
“I’m advised that there’s a security concern, and that is the 
reason that the United States Marshals Service is undertaking 
this measure.”  JA 457.  The court expressed willingness to 
“consider any matters that [the parties] might wish to bring to 
the court’s attention” on this issue.  Id.  In support of her 
position, Ayala provided the court with an opinion by the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Sanchez-
Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated as 
moot, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the visible use of 
shackles during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding is 
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prohibited, absent a finding of an essential state interest that 
justifies shackling.  Deck, 544 U.S. at 624.  The Court in Deck 
pointed to three principles underlying the “[j]udicial hostility 
to shackling”:  (1) shackles undermine the presumption that 
defendants are innocent until proven guilty, (2) shackles 
interfere with the right to counsel by making communication 
with one’s attorney more difficult, and (3) shackles challenge 
the dignity of the judicial process.  Id. at 630-31.  The Court 
acknowledged, however, that it does “not underestimate the 
need to restrain dangerous defendants to prevent courtroom 
attacks, or the need to give trial courts latitude in making 
individualized security determinations.”  Id. at 632. 
 
This Court addressed the issue of shackling during a 
civil rights trial of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at which the 
plaintiff, a prisoner, testified before the jury in visible shackles.  
Sides v. Cherry, 609 F.3d 576, 579-80 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
warned that district courts, “[a]t the least . . . should hold a 
proceeding outside the presence of the jury to address” whether 
a party should be shackled.  Id. at 582.  While courts may rely 
heavily on the Marshals’ recommendation, we explained that 
they cannot hand their discretion entirely to the Marshals.  Id.  
We recognized: 
 
district courts have the weighty 
responsibility of ensuring the 
security of their courtrooms, and 
endorse their broad discretion in 
determining whether it is 
necessary to have a prisoner-party 
or witness physically restrained 
during a civil trial.  So long as a 
district court engages in an 
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appropriate inquiry and supplies a 
reasonable basis for its decision, 
we will defer to its determination 
that physical restraints are 
necessary to ensure courtroom 
security, as the trial judge is 
uniquely positioned and qualified 
to make that determination. 
 
Id. at 585-86. 
 
While Deck and Sides provide the relevant legal 
principles to decide the issue before us, their factual and legal 
contexts are sufficiently distinct from Ayala’s situation.  The 
Supreme Court in Deck acknowledged that the reasons against 
shackling a criminal defendant at the guilt phase “apply with 
like force to penalty proceedings in capital cases” because the 
jury must “decid[e] between life and death.”  Deck, 544 U.S. 
at 632.  Ayala, however, did not face the death penalty, nor did 
a jury sentence her.  Moreover, the mandate in Sides for a 
“proceeding outside the presence of the jury” to determine if 
shackles are warranted is not applicable here, where the 
sentencing was conducted by the judge alone.  Sides, 609 F.3d 
at 582.  While the District Court acknowledged that it 
“defer[s]” to the Marshals, in offering to hear arguments and 
accept briefing, it demonstrated that it did not merely delegate 
the decision.  JA 458-59.   
 
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and 
Ninth Circuits have considered this issue.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a separate evaluation 
of the need to restrain a party in court is not required in the 
“context of non-jury sentencing proceedings” because courts 
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“traditionally assume that judges, unlike juries, are not 
prejudiced by impermissible factors.”  United States v. Zuber, 
118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997).  More recently, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that “the rule against 
shackling does not apply to a sentencing hearing before a 
district judge.”  United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 
(11th Cir. 2015).  The court reasoned, relying on Deck, that the 
traditional rule against shackling was designed to protect 
defendants appearing before a jury.  Id.   
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, 
held that a district-wide policy of routinely shackling all 
pretrial detainees in the courtroom is unconstitutional.  
Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 666.  The court held that district 
courts must make individualized findings that a defendant 
presents a security threat before he or she is shackled and that 
this requirement applies at all stages of the criminal process, 
regardless of jury presence.  Id. at 661, 666.  But even if the 
Supreme Court had not vacated this decision as moot, it would 
not help Ayala.  Ayala was not subjected to a blanket policy 
requiring shackling; instead, the Marshals recommended she 
be shackled and the District Court agreed.   
 
We are not persuaded that a bright-line rule is necessary 
to our disposition here.  We instead emphasize the importance 
of the discretion that both Deck and Sides recognized.  District 
courts need “latitude” to make “individualized security 
determinations,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 632, because they are 
“uniquely positioned and qualified,” Sides, 609 F.3d at 586, to 
determine a defendant’s potential security risk (or lack 
thereof).  
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We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Ayala’s request to remove her shackles during her 
criminal sentencing. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Ayala’s 
judgment of conviction and sentence. 
